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I. INTRODUCTION
Portland, Maine, sits serenely on the banks of Casco Bay. It suffers
few of the typical problems of large metropolitan areas. The city is clean;
the traffic is manageable; there is no apparent crime problem; and people
generally know one another. In 1985, however, the FCC began the
competitive process of deciding who would be licensed to provide cellular
telephone service to Portland, and chaos and irony reigned. Thirteen years
later, after a bitter legal battle among local telephone companies, a provider
was finally selected. At one point or another, all three branches of
government became involved: Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, a federal district
court in Maine, the Solicitor General's Office, the Office of Legal Counsel
and Civil Division (OLC) within the Department of Justice, as well as the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). The license itself changed hands three
times during the case and, in essence, three different telephone systems
were constructed. The FCC observed that "the litigiousness of the parties in
this proceeding [was] staggering."'
1. The full recitation of all decisions in the case follows: Saco River Cellular, Inc. v.
FCC, 133 F.3d 25 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Northeast Cellular Tel. Co. v. FCC,
119S. Ct. 47 (1998), (U.S. Oct. 5, 1998) (No. 97-1838); Portland Cellular Partnership v.
FCC, No. 94-1653, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 34385 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 18, 1994); Saco River
Cellular, Inc. v. FCC, No. 91-1248, 94-1500, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 28169 (D.C. Cir. Sept.
16, 1994); Northeast Cellular Tel. Co., L.P. v. FCC, 897 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
Applications of Portland Cellular Partnership & Northeast Cellular Tel. Co., L.P., Order, 11
F.C.C.R. 19,997, 5 Comm. Reg.2d (P & F) 540 (1996) [hereinafter Portland Cellular
Order]; Applications of Portland Cellular Partnership & Northeast Cellular Tel. Co., L.P.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 3291, 75 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 743 (1994);
Applications of Portland Cellular Partnership & Northeast Cellular Tel. Co., L.P.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 4146, 73 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 175 (1993);
Application of Portland Cellular Partnership, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 F.C.C.R.
2283, 69 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 214 (1991); Application of Lewiston-Auburn Cellular, Inc. &
Portland Cellular Partnership, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 2514 (1989);
Application of Portland Cellular Partnership & Lewiston-Auburn Cellular, Inc.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 2292 (1989); Lewiston-Auburn Cellular, Inc.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3 F.C.C.R. 5115, 65 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 145 (1988);
Application of Portland Cellular Partnership, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 F.C.C.R.
5586, 5 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 540 (1987); Application of Lewiston-Auburn Cellular, Inc.,
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At times, the case appeared to come straight out of Alice in
Wonderland. For instance, the originally licensed entity, PortCell, was
stripped of its operating authority for failing to make a sufficient showing
that it could finance and build the Portland system even though it had
already successfully financed, built, and operated the system. Moreover, the
financing on which PortCell relied came from a NYNEX-owned company.
NYNEX encountered no particular difficulty in financing and building
much larger, more complex cellular systems in New York and Boston; yet,
apparently, Portland was just too much.
Ultimately, the case was decided not on the basis of whether PortCell
complied with the financial showing regulation, but whether the FCC itself
complied with a preexisting federal law, the Paperwork Reduction Act
(PRA), in adopting the regulation in the first place. That law, unlike many
other statutes, tolerates no violations. Noncompliance simply renders the
regulation at issue unenforceable notwithstanding any other law. Despite
this override, it still took an act of Congress to clarify how and when the
public protection provision could be used.
2The Washington Post wrote a half-page story about the case. This
Article attempts to tell the whole story from one lawyer's viewpoint and to
piece together how the judicial branch, Congress, and administrative
agencies function when there is an intervening change in law during an
actively litigated case.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The 1980 Paperwork Reduction Act
In 1942, Congress enacted the Federal Reports Act (FRA)3 to control
the growing amount of federal paperwork created by administrative
agencies. From the beginning, the FRA provided that federal agencies
could not "conduct or sponsor the collection of information... from ten or
more persons" unless the "pertinent regulations" were first submitted for
4review to what was then the Bureau of the Budget. There were no
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 5546 (1987); Application of Saco River Tel.
Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 F.C.C.R. 2009, 62 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 999
(1987); see also Portland Cellular Partnership v. United States, No. 94-61-P-H (D. Me.
1994) (dismissing private right of action collaterally attacking FCC Order under the 1980
PRA) (on file with the District Court of Maine).
2. See Bill McAllister, How a Wired Lobbyist Disconnected a Cell Phone Franchise,
WASHNGTON POST, Sept. 28, 1998, at A23.
3. See Pub. L. No. 77-831, 56 Stat. 1078 (1942) (repealed 1980).
4. Id.§5.
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penalties imposed on agencies for violating the FRA, and it was honored in
the breach. In the 1970s, concern over this enforcement problem and the
increasing time and expense of complying with federal agency paperwork
requests led to the establishment of the Commission on Federal PaperworkS 6
(Commission).' As a result of the Commission's recommendations, the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (1980 PRA)7 was enacted as a successor
to the FRA. The Act combined a paperwork clearance process with a
comprehensive, government-wide paperwork management framework
managed by the OMB through its OIRA. The heart of the statute, section
3507, provided that:
(a) An agency shall not conduct or sponsor the collection of
information unless in advance of the adoption or revision of the
request for collection of such information-
(1) the agency has (C) submitted to the Director [of OMB] the
certification required under section 3506(c)(3), the proposed
collection of information, copies of pertinent statutory authority,
regulations, and other related materials as the Director may
specify;
(3) the agency has obtained from the Director a control number to
be displayed upon the collection of information.
8
This Act continued the general approach of the FRA, requiring
clearance of federal paperwork requirements. The 1980 PRA added teeth to
the OMB clearance requirement. There was, however, no remedy for
agency violations of the FRA. Section 3512, the public protection
provision, barred enforcement of agency paperwork requirements that did
not have the required OMB control number:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be
subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of
information that is subject to this chapter if-
(1) the collection of information does not display a valid control
number9 assigned by the Director in accordance with this
chapter.
5. See S. REP. No. 96-930, at 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6241, 6244.
6. See Efforts to Reduce Federal Paperwork Burdens: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Federal Spending Practices and Open Government of the Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong. 40-41 (1978).
7. Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812-2826 (current version at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-
3520).
8. 44 U.S.C. § 3507(a)(1)-(3) (Supp. 111996). In addition, 44 U.S.C. § 3507(0 allows
independent agencies such as the FCC to override the OMB, which is part of the executive
branch, in the event clearance is refused, thus avoiding constitutional problems under the
Separation of Powers clause.
9. 44 U.S.C. § 3512 (Supp. 11995) (emphasis added).
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Thus, the Act provided that no penalty could be levied where an
agency has not obtained the required clearance. The legislative history
emphasizes that a regulation without the required control number is a
"bootleg" request that can be ignored with impunity.'0
B. The FCC's Cellular Financial Rule
While the FCC generally complied with the 1980 PRA, there were
occasional lapses that generally went unnoticed. One such lapse came in
December 1985, when the FCC tightened its financial qualification rules
for companies applying for cellular licenses. Until 1985, section 22.917(a)
provided that applications "shall demonstrate the applicant's financial
ability to meet the realistic and prudent [expenses]" in a manner that shows
with "reasonable assurance" that the funds needed to construct a proposed
system and operate it for one year would be available. ' The amendment
resulted in a more strict financial showing standard requiring applicants to
obtain and submit a "firm financial commitment" letter in support of their
applications. 2 The rule at issue, section 22.917(b), reads as follows:
The tentative selectee chosen in a random selection process ... shall
within [thirty] days of the [p]ublic [n]otice announcing such status,
obtain a firm financial commitment for the financing necessary to
construct and operate for one year its proposed cellular system and
shall amend its application to so demonstrate.
13
The firm financial commitment rule was published in the Federal
Register. Despite the fact that the rule clearly required a collection of
information from a lending institution, the Commission made no
application to the OMB for assignment of the required control number.
C. The Portland Licensing Case Begins
In 1986, five local telephone company affiliates filed applications for
the wireline cellular license in Portland.14 Because they did not reach a full
10. S. REP. No. 96-930, at 17, 52 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6241, 6257,
6292.
11. 47 C.F.R. § 22.917(a) (1985); see also Application of Advanced Mobile Phone
Serv., Inc., 91 F.C.C.2d 512, paras. 7-12, 52 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 735 (1982).
12. Amendment of the Comm'n's Rules to Allow the Selection from Mutually
Exclusive Competing Cellular App'ns Using Random Selection or Lotteries Instead of
Comparative Hearings, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Further Reconsideration, 59
Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 407,412-13 (1985).
13. 47 C.F.R. § 22.917(b)(1)(i) (1986). The FCC also adopted a requirement that the
firm financial commitment be from "a recognized bank or other financial institution and
shall evidence the lender's determination that it has assessed the creditworthiness of the loan
applicant and that it is committed to providing the necessary financing .... Id.
14. Under the rules, only those local landline carrier affiliates with certificates were
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settlement, the FCC held a lottery to select a winner.I Using the same
plexiglass drum that the Selective Service used for the Vietnam War draft
lotteries, the FCC drew numbers and ranked the five applicants as follows:
1. Seacoast Cellular, Inc.
2. Saco River Cellular, Inc.
3. Community Service Telephone Company (later renamed Lewiston-
Auburn)
4. Northeast Cellular Telephone Company, LP
5. NYNEX Mobile Communications Company
Three of the companies-Seacoast, Community, and NYNEX-were
eligible local telephone company affiliates that, before the lottery, entered
into a partial settlement combining their interests into PortCell, as the
FCC's rules then permitted. Thus, Seacoast's first-ranked status made
PortCell the lottery winner, and the Seacoast application was amended to
substitute PortCell. In response to the FCC's financial rule, PortCell
submitted a loan commitment obtained from NYNEX Credit Corporation,
an affiliate of NYNEX Mobile, which lacked certain required terms.
In 1987, the FCC staff found the NYNEX credit letter to be sufficient
and awarded PortCell the license, overruling Northeast's objection to the
financial showing. 16 The Portland system was built and began operation in
June 1988.17 Northeast appealed the decision to the FCC. On review, the
FCC found that PortCell had not strictly complied with section 22.917(b),
but waived the rule given its experience with NYNEX's ability to build and
finance telephone systems.
18
D. The First Court of Appeals Decision
Northeast then appealed the waiver grant to the D.C. Circuit. After a
contentious oral argument, during which the court specifically discounted
the fact that PortCell had already successfully financed the building of the
system, the court held that the FCC's waiver was "arbitrary and capricious
eligible for this block of frequencies. See 47 C.F.R. § 22.901 (1986).
15. At that time, the FCC was obliged to use lotteries for resolving certain types of
license contests instead of the traditional comparative hearings. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)
(1994 & Supp. III 1997). Since that time, lotteries have been replaced by auctions. See 47
U.S.C. § 309(j) (1994 & Supp. 1 1997).
16. See Application of Portland Cellular Partnership, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
2 F.C.C.R. 5586, 5 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 540 (1987).
17. In March 1989, the FCC approved the merger of the PortCell's Portland system and
the system owned by one of the PortCell partners in the adjacent Lewiston-Auburn market.
This resulted in combined service to the Portland/Lewiston-Aubum markets.
18. See Application of Portland Cellular Partnership, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
4 F.C.C.R. 2050, 2051, 66 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 94, 96 (1989).
[Vol. 52
THE BATTLE FOR PORTLAND, MAINE
because it was not based on any rational waiver policy."' 9 In a strongly
worded opinion, the court added, "given the record in this case, we cannot
imagine any standard that would have justified a waiver' 20 The court
indicated that "[b]igness and national reputation are not reasonable
standards for a waiver policy .... It follows that this waiver reflects an
outrageous, unpredictable, and unworkable policy that is susceptible to
discriminatory application "'2' It thus vacated the order and remanded the
case to the FCC, stating in the conclusion to its opinion:
At a minimum, the FCC needed to indicate what information it had
about NYNEX Credit's uncommitted assets, NYNEX Credit's
practices in evaluating the creditworthiness of loan applicants, the
terms it would imply into NYNEX Credit's loan letter based upon its
prior experience, and its basis for concluding that NYNEX Credit
would commit funds regardless of whether NYNEX Mobile
abandoned the partnership. Absent a finding that this information was
considered and used in formulating an articulatable standard at the
time the waiver was granted, the FCC must disqualify Port Cell's
application.
2 2
The FCC's compliance with the 1980 PRA was not addressed by any party
or the court.
E. Remand and Further Appeals
On remand in 1991, the FCC followed suit and found that PortCell's
showing failed to set forth the terms of the loan commitment and did not
evidence the lender's assessment of the creditworthiness of the loan
applicant.23 The FCC thus rescinded PortCell's license based on a violation
24
of the firm financial commitment rule. It also dismissed the application of
the first runner-up in the lottery, Saco River, for violation of certain
technical rules concerning radio signal coverage.25 The FCC refused to
consider the next-ranked runner-up, Community, which was one of the
PortCell partners. The 1991 order granted PortCell interim operating
authority until the objections to Northeast's application, the (fourth-in-line)
26
could be resolved. Northeast was eventually found qualified in a separate
19. Northeast Cellular Tel. Co. v. FCC, 897 F.2d 1161, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
20. Id. at 1165.
21. Id. at 1167.
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. See Application of Portland Cellular Partnership, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
6 F.C.C.R. 2283, para. 5, 69 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 214 (1991).
24. See id. at par. 9.
25. See id. at para. 10.
26. See id. at para. 11.
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order and awarded the license.27
PortCell, Saco River, and Community appealed the FCC's decision to
the D.C. Circuit. Community, a partner in PortCell and a separate
applicant in its own right, timely petitioned the FCC for reconsideration
taking issue with the dismissal of PortCell's application.29 Community
argued that its merger into PortCell was contingent on a grant of the
PortCell application.0 Because of the pendency of Community's
reconsideration petition, the court of appeals held the PortCell and SacoS 31
River appeals in abeyance, as is its usual practice.
While the Community petition was pending before the agency, the
FCC issued a series of decisions in other cases regarding cellular applicants
who violated various aspects of the firm financial commitment rule and
32thus were denied licenses. The FCC, based on the OMB opinion letters
that section 22.917 was subject to the 1980 PRA, found, on
reconsideration, that it consequently had not obtained the required OMB
control number for the financial showing. The Commission thus concluded
that under the public protection provision of the 1980 PRA, it could not
lawfully enforce the rule and ultimately reinstated the applications.
Shortly thereafter, a check of the OMB files revealed that section
22.917(b) had not been cleared-neither the requirement to obtain a firm
financial commitment from a bank nor the requirement to submit the letter
to the agency of such a commitment were met. PortCell spent the next three
years trying to get the FCC to address the fact that it had not complied with
27. See Applications of Portland Cellular Partnership & Northeast Cellular Tel. Co.,
L.P., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 4146, 73 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 175
(1993).
28. See Saco River Cellular, Inc. v. FCC, No. 91-1248, 94-1500, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 28169 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 16, 1994).
29. See Applications of Portland Cellular Partnership & Northeast Cellular Tel. Co.,
L.P., supra note 27,at para. 1.
30. See id. at para. 5.
31. See Saco River Cellular, Inc., 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 28169, at *2.
32. See Dana Comm., Ltd., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 1878, 70
Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 891 (1992); Applications of Foster, Fair Oaks Cellular Partnership,
Progressive Cellular Ill B-2, & Pacific Nat'l Cellular, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7
F.C.C.R. 7971, 71 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1284 (1992). In one case, the FCC held that the
1980 PRA required reinstatement even though the applicants had not raised the PRA issue
in their reconsideration petitions. See Applications of Asset Management Corp., Carale
Cellular Partners, Cetercom Comm. Co., Chase, McDonald, & Elleron Cellular Corp.,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 6538 (1991). None of these cases, however,
had reached the judicial review stage.
33. See Dana Comm., Ltd., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 5382, 69
Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1178 (1991); Applications for Review and Petitions for
Reconsideration of Rural Service Area Cellular App'n, 6 F.C.C.R. 5378, 69 Rad. Reg.2d
1117 (1991).
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the 1980 PRA and thus had no authority to enforce section 22.917(b)
against it.
Utilizing the fact that the Community petition remained pending and
that the 1980 PRA itself overrode all other laws, PortCell again filed a
petition for reconsideration on April 29, 1992-nearly a year after the
thirty-day statutory deadline set out in section 405. 34 The petition relied on
extensive case law recognizing that: (1) as long as a timely-filed petition
remained pending, the Commission had the discretion to consider a late-
filed reconsideration petition, and (2) the only reasonable exercise of that
discretion would be to vacate action that was contrary to the 1980 PRA
given the Act's express override and withdrawal of agency authority to
enforce the rule.35 On June 4, 1993, obviously not anxious to go back to the
D.C. Circuit with a license grant to PortCell, the FCC released a
Memorandum Opinion and Order stating that it had no authority to
consider PortCell's late-fied reconsideration petition under the statute. 6
The Memorandum Opinion and Order did not mention the override
provision in the 1980 PRA .
PortCell then filed separate timely petitions for reconsideration of
both the dismissal of PortCell's petition and the grant of the Northeast
application. On June 29, 1994, the FCC ruled on the former but not the
latter.3 8 The FCC noted that the other petition dealing with Northeast's
wireline qualifications would be dealt with in an upcoming order.39 The
FCC agreed that under prevailing case law, section 405 did not bar
consideration of the 1980 PRA claim given the pendency of the
Community petition. It nevertheless found no public interest reason to
exercise its discretion given the resources already expended on the case.40
The FCC noted that consideration of the 1980 PRA issue at this late stage
"might conflict with the Court's instructions."41 No case law or statute was
cited for ignoring the 1980 PRA.
When PortCell appealed and asked for a stay of the FCC Order, the
34. See 47 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1994).
35. See, e.g., Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Gardner v.
FCC, 530 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
36. See Applications of Portland Cellular Partnership & Northeast Cellular Tel. Co.,
L.P., 8 F.C.C.R. 4146,4146 n.4,73 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 175, 176 n.6 (1993).
37. See id.
38. See Applications of Portland Cellular Partnership & Northeast Cellular Tel. Co.,
L.P., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 3291, 75 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 743
(1994).
39. See id. at 3291 n.2.
40. See id. at 3292.
41. Id. at 3292 n.3.
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court unexpectedly dismissed it as "incurably premature" because action on
42
reconsideration of both applications had not been completed. The court
analogized to cases involving mixed rulemaking and adjudicatory rulings
where a party had appealed one action, but asked for agency
reconsideration of the other and was thrown out of Court.43 It thus found
FCC action on the PortCell application "nonfinal and unappealable"
because the successor's-Northeast-qualifications had not been finally
resolved by the agency.44 Because no appeal was validly on file, the court
considered the stay under the higher mandamus standard and summarily
denied it.
45
PortCell went off the air in November 1994. Not only was PortCell
out of business, but it had little immediate prospect for obtaining judicial
review. The effect of the court's ruling was to hold hostage PortCell's
ability to appeal the FCC's resolution of the petition for reconsideration of
the Northeast grant. At the time, the court had not resolved the
consequences of voluntarily withdrawing such a petition and whether it
46
would render a subsequent appeal untimely or restart the appeal period.
F The 1995 Paperwork Reduction Act
1. Legislative History
During this static period in the case, Congress by happenstance
decided to revisit the 1980 PRA in its entirety. In 1990, the Supreme Court
had ruled in Dole v. United Steelworkers of America47 that the OIR's
authority to review agency information collection activities under the 1980
PRA governed information collected by or for an agency, but did not
extend to third-party information disclosure requirements (e.g., the
requirement an employer maintain certain information for employee
42. Saco River Cellular, Inc. v. FCC, No. 91-1248, 94-1500, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
28169, *1 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 16, 1994).
43. See Saco River Cellular, Inc., 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *2; see also BellSouth
Corp. v. FCC, 17 F.3d 1487, 1489-90 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
44. Saco River Cellular, Inc., 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *3.
45. The court relied on GTE Service Corp., 762 F.2d 1024, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
which construed a motion for stay as petition for writ of mandamus because no appeal had
been filed giving the court jurisdiction under All Writs Act jurisdiction. See Saco River
Cellular, Inc., 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *2. A petition for mandamus must prove a "clear
and indisputable" right to such extraordinary relief. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v.
Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271,289 (1988).
46. See Los Angeles SMSA, L.P. v. FCC, 70 F.3d 1358 (D.C. Cir. 1995); accord
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 116 F.3d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (resolving when the
appeal period tolls).
47. 494 U.S. 26 (1990).
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review).4 ' Because of the Dole case and numerous violations of the Act by
the EPA and IRS, the need to amend the 1980 PRA became a bipartisan
issue. It began as part of "The Contract with America" legislation and
ultimately was one of the only initiatives which actually became law.
On February 7, 1995, Representative Crapo (R-Idaho) testified before
a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
in support of a strengthened public protection provision which was
designed to protect citizens from penalties if an agency violated or
threatened to violate the PRA-the original intent of the 1980 PRA.4 9 On
February 22, 1995, he read his earlier-prepared statement to his colleagues
and specifically referred to the Portland situation as illustrative of the
problem:
Unfortunately, it has come to my attention that a great deal of
confusion exists among the regulatory agencies and the courts
regarding what Congress intended in exacting this important
legislation, which has allowed some agencies to blatantly disregard the
[p]ublic [p]rotection provisions of [s]ection 3512. In at least one case I
know of, a [flederal agency did not clear a rule with OMB and did not
obtain an OMB control number, and then penalized the company for
not complying with the invalid regulation. So far, the agency has
refused to even respond to the threshold question of whether it
complied with the PRA or not.
50
In the same month, Representative Crapo formally offered his own
amendment to the public protection provision on the House floor.5 New
subsection (a) of 3512 largely repeated from the 1980 Act that
"notwithstanding any other.., law,. . . no... penalty" may be levied for
violation of a rule not having the required OMB control number (e.g., a
complete defense).Z New subsection (b), however, was added to make
crystal clear what "no penalty" protection meant and when it was available
(e.g., at any time during a pending case). Congressman Crapo began by
recognizing that "we have heard a lot about the important need for the
[PRA] in the legislation we are considering" and "[t]his amendment will
give that legislation... some teeth to truly protect... citizens."53 He added
48. See id. at 32.
49. See 141 CONG. REc. H5480-81 (1995) (statement of Rep. Crapo).
50. H.R. 830, Paperwork Reduction Act and Risk Assessment and Cost/Benefit Analysis
for New Regulations: Hearings on H.R. 830 Before the Subcomm. on National Economic
Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs of the House Comm. on Government
Reform and Oversight, 108th Cong. 8 (1995) (statement of Rep. Crapo); see also 141 CONG.
REC. H2028 (1995) (statement of Rep. Crapo).
51. See 141 CONG. REc. H2028 (1995) (statement of Rep. Crapo).
52. 44 U.S.C. § 3512(a) (1994).
53. 141 CONG. REc. H2028 (1995) (statement of Rep. Crapo).
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that it "will make it clear to the agencies, the regulators[,] and the courts in
this country, that we must start taking this [A]ct seriously" and further
explained that "[t]he purpose of this amendment is to clarify that when an
agency does not comply with the provisions of this [A]ct that its failure to
comply is a complete defense to the enforcement of the regulations that
violate the act:'5 4 The amendment was unopposed (418-0).
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (1995 PRA) 5 passed both
houses of Congress unanimously on April 6, 1995, with Congressman
Crapo's amendment essentially intact. Just prior to passage, Representative
Clinger, the House Conference Manager and Chairman of the House
Government Reform and Oversight Committee, introduced the 1995 PRA
for vote and observed:
Fourth, Mr. Speaker, and most importantly, the conference bill
protects the public by providing citizens with a complete legal defense
if agencies refuse to participate in a clearance process involving public
notice and comment, public protection, and OIRA review. This
provision is based on the very excellent amendment which was offered
on the House floor by our colleague, the gentleman from Idaho, Mr.
Mike Crapo.
56
Representative Crapo then engaged in a colloquy on the House floor
with Representative Clinger. Congressman Crapo observed that section
3512(b) "provides for the enforcement mechanism implicit in section 3512
as it was originally enacted by Congress in 1980" and "should end any
confusion . . . about how section 3512 was originally intended to work.
57
Representative Clinger agreed and then the following exchange regarding
the applicability of the new law to pending cases took place:
Mr. Clinger. The conference report is intended to clarify that it is
the intent of Congress that section 3512 requires agency information
collection requests .. .to be submitted to OMB and receive a valid
control number. If not, the public need not respond, no[r] may it be
subjected to any penalty for failing to comply with such an
unenforceable collection of information.
Mr. Crapo. [Ils it the chairman's understanding that section 3512
will become effective as of October 1, 1995, and will apply to all cases
then pending before the [flederal agencies or the courts?
Mr. Clinger. [T]he gentleman is absolutely correct. As of October
1, 1995, the defense provided in section 3512 is available at any time
in an ongoing dispute.
54. Id.
55. Pub. L. No. 104-13, 109 Stat. 163-185 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-
3520).
56. 141 CONG. REc. H4374 (1995) (statement of Rep. Clinger).
57. 141 CONG. REc. H4376 (1995) (statement of Rep. Crapo).
58. 141 CONG. REc. H4376 (1995) (statements of Rep. Clinger & Rep. Crapo).
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No contrary views were expressed and the bill passed the House 423-0
immediately thereafter.
On the Senate side, Senator Roth, Chairman of the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee and the Senate Conference Manager,
introduced the final bill on the Senate floor and observed:
Mr. President, the topic that captured more time in conference
discussion than any other was that of redrafting section 3512, which
provides public protection against agency noncompliance with the
[PRA]. Since 1980, the [A]ct has provided a fundamental protection to
every citizen that he or she need not comply with, or respond to, a
collection of information if such collection does not display a valid
control number given by OMB as evidence that the collection was
reviewed and approved by OIRA. And if the collection does not
display a valid control number, the agency may not impose any penalty
on the citizen who fails to comply or respond.
In order to strengthen and underscore congressional desire to
protect the public, the conferees included a definition of penalty at the
end of section 3502 to make clear that the term not only applies to the
payment of a fine but also to the denial of a benefit. What this means is
that if an agency does not . . . act on a citizen's request for a
[g]overnment benefit because the citizen did not complete a form that
fails to display a valid OMB clearance number, it is the agency-not
the citizen-that stands in violation of law. Once this is determined,
the agency would not only owe the citizen the benefits due but also
perhaps interest as well.
... [The Act] now requires the agency to inform the person who
is to respond to the collection of information ... unless it displays a
valid control number.
Moreover, in section 3512(b) the conferees made clear that the
protections of section 3512 may be raised at any time during the life of
the matter. The protections cannot be waived. Failure to raise them at
any early stage does not preclude later assertion of rights under this
section, regardless of any agency or judicial rules to the contrary.
Neither the House nor the Senate sought to change the policy of
the 1980 Act that all agencies, including independent agencies, have
their information collections, even those by regulation, subjected to
OMB review and approval.
59
No contrary views were expressed and the legislation passed
unanimously. The joint statement issued by the conferees as part of the
conference report stated that "[tjo the extent the legislation is a restatement
59. 141 CONG. REc. S5274-75 (1995) (statement of Sen. Roth) (emphasis added).
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of the 1980 Act, as amended in 1988, the scope, underlying purposes, basic
requirements, and legislative history of the law are unchanged?".
It described the amendments to the public protection provision as
follows:
The House amendment contains a provision which clarifies and
strengthens the Act's current "public protection" provision by enabling
a person to assert this protection at any time during an agency
administrative process or any subsequent judicial review of an agency
action involving a penalty.
The Senate recedes with an amendment. The conference
agreement clarifies and strengthens the Act's "public protection"
provision by explicitly providing that the protection provided by the
section may be asserted or raised by a person in the form of a complete
defense, bar, or other manner, at any time during a[n] agency
administrative process or any subsequent judicial review. The
protection provided by the section applies if the agency fails to display
a valid control number .... 61
2. Relevant Changes to the Act
The 1995 Act recodified certain portions of the original 1980 Act and
amended other sections. Section 3507 continues to read, "[a]n agency shall
not conduct or sponsor the collection of information" unless it applies to
62the OMB and obtains the required control number. The override and no
penalty language of the public protection provision was repeated. New
section 3512(a) included one clarification:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be
subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of
information that is subject to this chapter if-
(1) the collection of information does not display a valid control
number assigned by the Director in accordance with this chapter;
or
(2) the agency fails to inform the person who is to respond to the
collection of information that such person is not required to
respond to the collection of information unless it displays a valid
control number.
63
There is no mention of this change in the legislative history. The
60. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-99, at 28 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 239,
240; see S. REP. No. 96-930 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6241.
61. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-99, at 36 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 239,
248; see S. REP. No. 96-930 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6241.
62. 47 U.S.C. § 3507 (Supp. II 1996).
63. 44 U.S.C. § 3512(a) (Supp. 1 1995) (emphasis added). The language "failing to
comply" was substituted for "failing to maintain or provide." No explanation is offered in
the legislative history. The new language is more comprehensive and keeps with the original
concept that an uncleared collection is a "bootleg" request with which no one has to comply.
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previous section protected a failure to "maintain or provide" the
information required by an agency.64 The new phrase was simply an attempt
to ensure the broadest possible protection from an uncleared collection
requirement.
New section 3512(b) spelled out in the broadest possible terms how
and when the protection afforded by the no penalty clause could be utilized
by members of the public where an unclear rule was involved. Section
3512(b) now states: "The protection provided by this section may be raised
in the form of a complete defense, bar, or otherwise at any time during the
agency administrative process or judicial action applicable thereto." 65
The "or otherwise" phrase was meant to capture anticipatory actions,
such as injunctive relief, filed by a member of the public before an agency
levied an unlawful penalty or began an enforcement proceeding. The 1995
statute also adopted a broad definition of the term "penalty" to include "the
imposition by an agency or court of a . . . revocation, suspension,
reduction, or denial of a license, privilege, right, grant, or benefit?' The
conference report indicated that "this was merely a codification of the
definition of 'penalty' found in the Act's implementing regulations, at 5
C.FR. 1320.7(m)."67
The 1995 PRA was signed into law May 22, 1995, and became
effective generally October 1, 1995. In the meantime, PortCell's petition
for reconsideration remained pending. No ruling was ever needed. On
October 11, 1995, ten days after the 1995 PRA became effective, PortCell
filed a motion to reinstate PortCell's application Nunc Pro Tunc and an
amendment showing that the applicant was fully capable of building a new
system.'a The motion asserted that the Commission failed to obtain the
required OMB control number for section 22.917(b) prior to PortCell
making its showing under the rule and thus invoked the complete defense
provided by section 3512(b).69
64. 44 U.S.C. § 3512(a) (1994).
65. 44 U.S.C. § 3512(b) (Supp. 11995) (emphasis added).
66. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3502(14) (West Supp. 1999) (emphasis added).
67. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-99, at 37, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 239, 249. The
OMB issued regulations implementing the 1995 PRA on August 29, 1995. Paperwork
Reduction Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 44,978, 44,986 (1995). The operative language tracks closely
the text of section 3512, as modified by the 1995 PRA.
68. See Appellant's Motion to Reinstate PortCell's Application Nunc Pro Tunc, Grant
the Application as Amended, and Set Aside the Northeast Grant, Portland Cellular Order,
I 1 F.C.C.R. 19,997, 5 Comm. Reg.2d (P & F) 540 (1996). PortCell also attached the actual
loan documents used to finance the building of its original system. See id. at attachment E.
69. See id. at 10, 12.
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G. The Final FCC Decision on Remand
The Commission's first response was to ask the OLC for advice on
how the 1995 Act applied to this pending case. The OLC wrote back
stating that they would only address the matter if the FCC agreed to be
bound by whatever opinion it issued on the new statute. 0 Ultimately,
however, the OLC declined to intervene because of its policy and practice
71
of not getting involved in actively litigated cases.
Thereafter, on November 21, 1996, the FCC found that while
previously there was some doubt about the interplay between the 1980
PRA's public protection provision and the requirement to file petitions for
reconsideration within thirty days, new section 3512(b) "simply trumps
[s]ection 405(a) . *..  ,2 The FCC ruled that under the terms of the new
statute and Congress's plain intentions, PortCell was entitled to raise the
agency's failure to comply with the 1995 PRA as a complete defense at any
time during the agency administrative process.73 Relying on Landgraf v.
USI Film Products,74 the FCC also found that its recognition of the new
statutory remedy was not impermissibly retroactive because the statute
operated prospectively.75
On the merits of PortCell's 1995 PRA argument, the FCC concluded
that the financial showing requirement of section 22.917(b) was subject to
the 1995 PRA because it involved a collection of information by the
government and that it had not been cleared with OMB.76 Consistent with
OMB regulations,77 the FCC accepted PortCell's proffered financial
showing, noting the lack of any substantive objection, and granted the
application. Because Northeast's right to operate was premised on the
70. See Letter from Richard L. Shiffrin, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, to William E. Kennard, General Counsel, Federal Communications
Commission (May 15, 1996) (on file with the Federal Communications Law Journal). This
proposal raised a number of real constitutional concerns since Congress delegated to the
FCC, not an executive department agency, exclusive authority to resolve radio licensing
matters.
71. OLC essentially functions as a group of legal advisors to the President and typically
issue opinions on pure questions of law, including interpretation of new statutes.
72. Portland Cellular Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 19,997, para. 15, 5 Comm. Reg.2d (P & F)
540 (1996).
73. Id. at paras. 12-14.
74. 511 U.S. 244,275 (1994).
75. Id. at 275.
76. Portland Cellular Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 19,997, paras. 25-27, 5 Comm. Reg.2d (P &
F) 540 (1996).
77. See 5 C.F.R. § 1320.6 (1999) (stating that if an information collection requirement
lacks the required OMB approval, agencies must permit the applicant to provide or satisfy
the legal conditions "in [a] reasonable manner").
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outcome of the PortCell litigation, the Commission rescinded the grant to
Northeast, but allowed it to continue as an interim operator. The FCC never
resolved Northeast's wireline eligibility and instead dismissed as moot the
PortCell petition for reconsideration.8
H. The Second Court of Appeals Decision
Thereafter, Northeast appealed the Commission's order to the D.C.
Circuit. Despite the fact that "penalty" in the 1995 PRA is defined to
include equitable relief levied by a court, the FCC's Order was stayed
pending judicial review. Ultimately, however, the court unanimously
affirmed the FCC's reinstatement and grant of PortCell's application.79 It
agreed with the FCC that section 3512 trumps any inconsistent procedural
(or substantive) law because "notwithstanding any other ... law" means
what it says. Rejecting the argument that the application of section 3512(b)
would have an impermissible retroactive effect, the court explained,
because "[section] 3512(b) governs only the conduct of litigation after the
effective date of the statute and does nothing to reopen matters litigated
before that date, it does not offend any norm against retroactive
lawmaking."8 The court also observed that "[b]y permitting parties to raise
the [PRA] issue 'at any time' in ongoing proceedings, the statute does not
'impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability
for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already
completed."' 8'
The court of appeals also rejected petitioner's argument that
application of section 3512(b) in this proceeding would be unconstitutional
812under Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., because it would nullify the court'sprevious decision in the case. The court reasoned that application of the
78. See Portland Cellular Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 19,997, paras. 48, 5 Comm. Reg.2d (P &
F) 540 (1996).
79. See Saco River Cellular, Inc. v. FCC, 133 F.3d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
80. Id. at 31.
81. Id. Since the court of appeals' decision in Saco River Cellular, Inc., no other
opinion directly addressed the "at any time" language of the 1995 PRA. However, at least
one attempt has been made, albeit unsuccessfully, to raise the PRA issue for the first time in
support of a petition for rehearing of a denial of certiorari before the Supreme Court. See
Electronic Eng'g Co. v. FCC, 140 F.3d 1045 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 343 (1998),
reh'g denied 119 S. Ct. 583 (1998) (presenting the question does "the [1995 PRA] require[s]
the Supreme Court to entertain Petitioner's argument which is raised for the first time in a
petition for rehearing"). The Supreme Court turned down the invitation to address the 1995
PRA. It should be noted that the "at any time" language cannot be invoked unless a court
decides to take jurisdiction. Thus, the "at any time" language does not override the certiorari
process under which the Supreme Court has complete discretion whether to review a case.
Sup. CT. R. 10.
82. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
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1995 PRA did not unconstitutionally nullify a final judgment, both
"because no party... raised, and we did not purport to resolve, the PRA
issue'" and because the Northeast court did not in any event "render a final
judgment terminating the case," but instead "remanded it to the [FCC] for
further proceedings."" The court's opinion also dissolved the stay on the
FCC Order. Mandate, however, was stayed pending Supreme Court review
of Northeast's petition for certiorari. This delayed the effectiveness of the
FCC's decision to reinstate PortCell's license until October 5, 1998, when
the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 84 Almost immediately thereafter, the
court of appeals issued its mandate and the FCC awarded PortCell a license
on October 16, 1998.
III. THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRED THE FCC TO APPLY THE
"LAW IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF ITS DECISION"
A. The Law in Effect Principle and Its Limitations Where There Is
Judicial Finality
Throughout this proceeding, some argued that the changes made in
the 1995 PRA could not constitutionally be applied to this case. The
Constitution, however, actually compelled the FCC to give effect to the
intervening amendments by Congress. In gross terms, Article 185 of the
Constitution vests all legislative power in Congress, while Article in
86
entrusts interpretation of those laws to the judicial branch. This
conceptually neat scheme fits together well until Congress changes the law
after the judiciary has already become involved in a case.
In 1801, the Supreme Court confronted this problem in what has
become the seminal case on the intersection of legislative and judicial
powers during an active case. In United States v. Schooner Peggy,87 a
French schooner named Peggy was captured within U.S. waters and
condemned. While an appeal was pending, a treaty was signed restoring
property "not yet definitively condemned" 88 The Court held that because
the case was on appeal, it was not final and therefore the property at issue
could not be considered definitively condemned. The Court announced the
following constitutionally compelled principle under the Separation of
83. Saco River Cellular, Inc., 133 F.3d at 31.
84. See Saco River Cellular, Inc. v. FCC, 133 F.3d 25 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom., Northeast Cellular Tel. Co. v. FCC, 119 S. Ct. 47 (1998).
85. U.S. CONST. art. 1.
86. U.S. CONST. art. III.
87. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
88. Id. at 107.
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Powers doctrine: "the [C]ourt must decide according to existing laws, and
if it be necessary to set aside a judgment, rightful when rendered, but which
cannot be affirmed but in violation of law, the judgment must be set
aside' s9 Thus, the Court announced the principle that the Constitution
compels the judicial branch to apply the law in effect at the time of the
decision, which compelled return of the property.90
Almost 195 years later, the Court reiterated the vitality of Schooner
Peggy, while reminding Congress that its power is not without limit, in
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.91 In Plaut, Congress passed legislation to
allow parties to reopen cases finally dismissed as time barred. The time for
filing appeals of the dismissals had expired when Congress acted. The
Court ruled that Congress violated the Separation of Powers doctrine by
interfering with the final judgment of the judicial branch.92 Where a final
judgment has been rendered, the "judicial decision becomes the last word.
. . and Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that the law
applicable to that very case was something other than what the courts said
it was."93 Equally important, however, the Court also observed that unless a
case is truly final in the sense that "all appeals have been foregone or
completed ... [i]t is the obligation of the last court in the hierarchy that
rules on the case to give effect to Congress's latest enactment, even when
that has the effect of overturning the judgment of an inferior court, since
each court, at every level, must 'decide according to existing laws."' 94
Where a case has been remanded to an agency for further
proceedings, the Supreme Court has ruled explicitly that there is no final
judgment in the Plaut sense, thus Congress may change the decisional
95 96
criteria during the case. The Court stated in Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB,that remand "means simply that the case is returned to the administrative
89. Id. at 110.
90. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421
(1855) (concluding that Congress may alter the prospective effect of injunctions entered by
Article III courts because such continuing relief renders the case nonfinal); System Fed'n
No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 649-52 (1961).
91. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
92. See id. at 240.
93. Id. at 227 (emphasis omitted).
94. Id.
95. See Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 364 (1939); Robertson v. Seattle Audubon
Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 440 (1992) (holding that that Congress may directly "affect[] the
adjudication" of cases by administrative agencies "by effectively modifying the provisions
at issue in those cases" even after there have been judicial rulings); Women's Equity Action
League v. Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742, 751-52 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Morrow v. Dillard, 580
F.2d 1284, 1297 (5th Cir. 1978).
96. 305 U.S. 364 (1939).
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body in order that it may take further action in accordance with the
applicable law."97 Congress, therefore, can change the law applicable to a
case on remand without implicating separation of powers concerns. "Such
a remand does not dismiss or terminate the administrative proceeding ....
Whatever findings or order may subsequently be made will be subject to
challenge."
B. Impermissible Retroactivity Must Be Avoided by the Judiciary
Unless Overridden by Congress
By changing the law during an active case, however, Congress's
actions may raise other concerns about impermissible retroactivity. In
Landgraf v. USI Film Products," the seminal case on retroactivity, the
Supreme Court tried to spell out with more precision the interplay between
the law in effect at the time of the decision and the presumption against
retroactive application of new law during a case. In that case, a former
employee of USI Film Products brought an action alleging sexual
harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.20 The Court
held that provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, creating a right to
recover damages for violations of Title VII, did not apply to a Title VII
case pending on appeal when the statute was enacted.' °' The Court found
that Congress had not been clear enough to subject employers to damage
awards retroactively."
The Landgraf Court observed that the threshold test is whether
Congress clearly indicates that a new law is to operate retroactively. If so,
97. Id. at 374.
98. Id. At the intermediate court level, there may be a difference between a final case
and a final ruling on an issue in the case which the agency has opted not to challenge. In
Saco River Cellular, Inc., v. FCC, 133 F.3d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1998), however, the Solicitor
General's office took the position that until the opportunity for certiorari has passed in the
case, any issues, including those disposed of by the initial reviewing court, are nonfinal. See
Brief for the FCC in Opposition at 10-12, Northeast Cellular Tel. Co. v. FCC, 119 S. Ct. 47
(1998) (No. 97-1838). This so-called "reach back" theory relies on Supreme Court rules
allowing the Court to delve into any issue in the case whenever the case is before it. Sup.
CT. R. 10. In a decision, however, the D.C. Circuit held that a remand, which included
tightly worded instructions to the agency susceptible of only one result, was tantamount to a
final judgment because the agency did not challenge the ruling and the proceeding was
discrete. See Qualcomm Inc. v. FCC, No. 98-1246, 1999 WL 518838 (D.C. Cir. July 23,
1999) (concluding that the Pioneer Preference award docket in Qualcomm was separate and
apart from the licensing proceeding which would follow if a preference was granted).
99. 511 U.S. 244(1994).
100. See id. at 247-48; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (1)-2000e (14) (1994).
101. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 286.
102. See id.
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that is the end of the issue. The law in effect at the time must be applied
by the courts, assuming no other constitutional defects (e.g., ex post facto,
etc.). The Court observed that in Schooner Peggy, the Court's "application
of the 'law in effect' at the time of [its] decision.., was simply a response
to the language of the statute'" 04 The hard cases, of course, are where
Congress has been less than clear. The inquiry then revolves around
judicial default rules regarding whether application of the new law to the
pending case causes an impermissibly retroactive result.
The Landgraf Court described the threshold test as whether Congress
made its intention clear At another point, however, the Court put more
emphasis on the words of the statute: "the court's first task is to determine
whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach"' 0 5
Moreover, the Court's actual analysis of congressional intent went far
beyond the actual words of the statute and delved into its legislative history.
Subsequently, in Lindh v. Murphy,'06 the Supreme Court described
Landgraf's initial test as one involving "normal rules of construction" to
determine congressional intent.'0 7 Thus, the prevailing test appears to be
that courts must determine whether Congress's made its intentions clear.'0 8
Such an interpretation would seem to mirror the evolution of the first step
of the Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC'O° analysis in which a court looks to
"the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and
design of the statute as a whole" in determining the plain meaning of
Congress, assuming there is one." ° Although unstated in case law, as a
practical matter, it would appear that the more clearly retroactive a new
statute's application would be, the more express the statute itself may have
to be."'
Therefore, a lot hinges on the definition of retroactivity and how it is
applied in a given case. On this issue, Landgraf has much to say. The Court
103. See id. at 264.
104. Id. at 273.
105. Id. at 280 (emphasis added); see also Martin v. Hadix, 119 S. Ct. 1998, 2004 (1999)
(noting that the statute's language fell short of "clear congressional intent" and "'the
unambiguous directive' or 'express command' that the statute is to be applied
retroactively").
106. 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
107. Id. at 326.
108. See id.; but see Qualcomm Inc. v. FCC, No. 98-1246, 1999 WL 518838 (D.C. Cir.
July 23, 1999).
109. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
110. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988); see Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
467 U.S. at 845-51; Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270.
111. See, e.g., Qualcomm Inc., 1999 WL 518838 (finding clear retroactivity and a need
for express language in the statute to override such consequences).
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observed that it "must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal
consequences to events completed before [the statute's] enactment.' 2 It
added that "[a] statute does not operate 'retrospectively' merely because it
is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment
(citations omitted) or upsets expectations based in prior law."' The Court
noted "[w]hen the intervening statute authorizes or affects the propriety of
prospective relief, application of the new provision is not retroactive.'
1 4
The Court also recognized that "[b]ecause rules of procedure regulate
secondary rather than primary conduct," new procedural rules "may often
be applied in suits arising before their enactment without raising concerns
about retroactivity."'1 5 The Court noted, as a matter of common sense, that
new procedural rules sometimes should not be applied to pending cases.16
It gave two examples of such cases, explaining that "[a] new rule
concerning the filing of complaints would not govern an action in which
the complaint had already been properly filed under the old regime, and the
promulgation of a new rule of evidence would not require an appellate
remand for a new trial.
117
The Court, however, did not suggest that new procedural rules
generally should not be applied in any case in which a tribunal had already
reached a ruling based on a different procedural rule. To the contrary, the
Court cited Collins v. Youngblood"8 as an example of the proper application
of intervening procedural changes in pending cases.' 9 In Collins, a new
statute allowing the reformation of an improper jury verdict was applied
even though a lower court had concluded before the statute's adoption that
the only remedy for the improper jury verdict was a new trial. 20 In sum,
where a change in law is procedural, it generally must be applied by the
courts during an ongoing case unless the application is decisional with
regard to the merits of the case. Even then, a case's nonfinality may still
compel application of the new procedural law, but the burden to justify
such a result will be greater.
In the final analysis, the Court agreed that any particular test would
leave room for disagreement in hard cases and found that "the conclusion
112. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269-70.
113. Id. at 269.
114. Id. at 273.
115. Id. at 275; see also Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997) (noting "the natural
expectation" for "merely procedural" rules to "apply to pending cases").
116. SeeLandgraf, 511 U.S. at275 n.29.
117. Id.
118. 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
119. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 275 n.28.
120. See id.
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that a particular rule operates 'retroactively' comes at the end of a process
of judgment concerning the nature and extent of the change in the law and
the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and a
relevant past event."'
2
In a regulated industry, impermissible retroactivity is much harder to
prove than a typical civil controversy because cases tend to go on much
longer before becoming final; and the agency's relationship to the
reviewing court is different from a lower court in that it has its own
congressionally created public interest charter, which can be changed by
Congress at any time. Put another way, it is difficult to make a vested rights
argument in a licensing context. Such authorizations by their very nature
are limited in time and subject to changes in regulatory policy by the
agency granting them.'
For example, in Multi-State Communications, Inc. v. FCC,In the court
affirmed the FCC's implementation of Senator Bradley's bill, which was
enacted into the Communications Act, T2 following a remand. The
legislation had the effect of ending a long-pending case if applied, although
it did not speak directly to its availability in pending cases. Multi-State
filed a mutually exclusive application against RKO General's renewal for
WOR-TV in New York. The FCC disqualified RKO on character grounds
in three markets including New York. The court affirmed the Boston
license denial, but remanded the WOR case for evaluation of the station's
record.' 2' While on remand, Congress passed legislation granting a free and
clear license renewal "notwithstanding any other provision of law" to any
existing broadcaster willing and technically able to move to states without
a VHF television station (New Jersey or Delaware). 12 RKO applied under
the new law to move WOR to New Jersey. RKO merely moved its main
studio across the river to Seacaucus, New Jersey, because its transmitter
was already on the World Trade Center and served large portions of New
Jersey. Complying with the new law, the FCC granted RKO a license for a
full term despite the remand, dismissed Multi-State's long-pending
application, and terminated the proceeding.
In affirming the Commission's application of the intervening statute,
the court found the new law "permissible regulation of future action," even
121. Id. at 270; accord Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 520 U.S. 939, 947 (1997).
122. See 47 U.S.C. § 304 (1994).
123. 728 F.2d 1519 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
124. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at
scattered sections 47 U.S.C.).
125. See RKO Gen., Inc. v. FCC, 670 F.2d 215, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
126. 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1994 & Supp. 1 1996 & Supp. H 1997)
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though its operation terminated Multi-State's long-standing Ashbacker
Radio Corp. v. FCC127 hearing rights.12 The court pointed out that:
We note licensees of broadcasting stations acquire no prescriptive
right against the subsequent exercise of congressional power under the
commerce clause to delete their station to achieve fair geographical
distribution of broadcast service. (citation omitted) A fortiori, the mere
expectations of a license applicant cannot bar the legitimate exercise of
such congressional power. As the Supreme Court has advised: "Those
who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative
scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the
legislative end."
29
The court added that Congress may redefine the public interest and
apply it in pending cases: "Congress elevated the goal of providing
unserved states with an operational VHF commercial television station.
The Commission merely effected Congressional intent. The fact that the
Commission's action frustrated Multi-State's expectations is no basis for
finding that the Commission committed constitutional error."'"3
C. Because the Portland Case Was Not Final and the Intervening
Legislation Was Clear and Nonretroactive, the 1995
Amendments Had to Be Applied
Applying these principles to the Portland case demonstrates that: (1)
Congress clearly indicated that the changes to the public protection
provision were meant to apply to pending cases as well as override all other
laws, and (2) the 1995 amendments to the PRA neither operate nor were
applied retroactively by the FCC. Thus, the FCC was compelled to apply
the law in effect at the time of its decision. Congress clearly intended to
make section 3512(b) applicable to pending cases. Section 3512(b) became
effective on October 1, 1995, and from that day forward, by the terms of
the statute, complete relief from penalties based on rules not complying
with the 1995 PRA was made explicitly available at any time during an
ongoing case-whether it was before an agency or the courts.
Representative Crapo, the sponsor of the bill, and Conference
127. 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
128. Multi-State Comm., Inc., 728 F.2d at 1526; see also Ashbacker Radio Corp., 326
U.S. at 329-30.
129. Id. at 1526 n.12; but see Qualcomm Inc. v. FCC, No. 98-1246, 1999 WL 518838
(D.C. Cir. July 23, 1999).
130. Multi-State Comm., Inc., 728 F.2d at 1526 (citations omitted); accord Hispanic Inf.
& Telecomms. Network v. FCC, 865 F.2d 1289, 1294-95 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
131. See Pub. L. No. 104-13, § 4(a), 109 Stat. 185 (1995). There was a specific carve-out
for existing regulations which already had an OMB control number as of September 30,
1995. See id. at § 4(c).
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Manager and Committee Chairman Clinger stated expressly in a colloquy
just before unanimous passage that complete relief from 1995 PRA
violations was meant to be available in pending cases:
Mr. Crapo. If the gentleman would respond to one more question,
I would like to ask, is it the chairman's understanding that section 3512
will become effective as of October 1, 1995, and will apply to all cases
then pending before the Federal agencies or the courts?
Mr. Clinger: Mr. Speaker, the gentleman is absolutely correct. As
of October 1, 1995, the defense provided in section 3512 is available at
any time in an ongoing dispute.
There was no objection and the House thereafter immediately passed the
legislation unanimously.
Both the recodified public protection clause (now section 3512(a))
and the new section 3512(b), which implemented how and when relief can
be obtained, are drafted in the broadest possible terms:
Section 3512(a) Section 3512(b)
Notwithstanding any other The protection provided by
provision of law, no this section may be raised
person shall be subject to in the form of a complete
any penalty for failing to defense, bar, or otherwise
comply with" an uncleared at any time during the
"collection of information agency administrative
process or judicial action
applicable thereto.
33
Similarly, the term "penalty" was defined expansively to include any
adverse action by an agency relating to the uncleared rule, including
adverse licensing matters. The reuse of the phrase "notwithstanding any
other... law" from the old Act reemphasized the PRA's availability.'34 The
"at any time" phrase uses similarly broad language and interprets the
protection afforded by the notwithstanding provision. There is a well-
established canon of construction that statutory provisions are to be
construed in light of the company they keep.
35
132. 141 CONG. Rae. H4376 (1995) (statements of Rep. Crapo & Rep. Clinger).
133. 44 U.S.C. § 3512(a)-(b) (Supp. 11995) (emphasis added).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1997) (concluding that "any
person" means any, whether one or a number); Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 508 U.S.
10, 18 (1993) (emphasizing that "notwithstanding" is as clear as it gets in terms of
legislative drafting and means all other laws are overridden); Excelsior Wooden Pipe Co. v.
Pacific Bridge Co., 185 U.S. 282, 287 (1902) (reasoning that a statute allowing court to
dismiss suit for lack of jurisdiction "at any time" after it is brought means what it says);
Cvelbar v. CBI El., Inc., 106 F.3d 1368, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a challenge to
subject matter jurisdiction can be raised literally at any time during the case).
135. See Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961) (referring to this canon
as the principle of maxim noscitur a sociis, which means "a word is known by the company
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Moreover, the purpose behind adding section 3512(b) was to ensure
the public was broadly and clearly protected. Congress created a complete
defense, bar, or otherwise to protect the public against any imaginable
problem which could develop as a result of an uncleared rule.1
31
Representative Clinger emphasized: "most importantly, the conference bill
protects the public by providing citizens with a complete legal defense.'
37
Senator Roth observed that "the topic that captured more time in
conference discussion than any other was that of redrafting section 3512,
which provides public protection against agency noncompliance with the
[PRA].' ' 138 He also indicated that the public protection provision was
intended to provide unwaivable relief as long as a case is still ongoing:
Since 1980, the act has provided a fundamental protection to every
citizen that he or she need not comply with, or respond to, a collection
of information if such collection does not display a valid control
number given by OMB.
Moreover, in section 3512(b) the conferees made clear that the
protections of section 3512 may be raised at any time during the life of
the matter. The protections cannot be waived. Failure to raise them at
any early stage does not preclude later assertion of rights under this
section, regardless of any agency or judicial rules to the contrary.
There is no legislative history to support the contention that Congress
intended to limit the availability of section 3512(b) relief where a member
of the public was the victim of a PRA violation. There simply is no support
that Congress intended to limit the availability of section 3512(b) only to
cases that began after the October 1, 1995, effective date and not one day
before. By section 3512(b)'s plain meaning in context, Congress intended
the changes to the public protection provision to apply to pending cases.
Even if it could be argued that Congress's intent was unclear, the
FCC's application of new section 3512(b) did not involve genuine
retroactivity, and thus the law in effect must be applied. Section 3512(b)
does not establish any new standard of conduct. The preexisting statute
already deprived the government of authority to render a penalty. The new
statute merely clarified that relief is available if the government violated
the preexisting OMB clearance requirement. Relief is only available in
it keeps"); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989) (concluding that when "in
expounding a statute, we [are] not.., guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence,
but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy" (citations
omitted)).
136. 44 U.S.C. § 3512(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
137. 141 CONG. REc. H4374 (1995) (statement of Rep. Clinger).
138. 141 CONG. REc. S5274 (1995) (statement of Sen. Roth).
139. 141 CONG. REc. S5274-75 (1995) (statement of Sen. Roth).
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ongoing cases and, therefore, was properly applied prospectively to
eliminate a penalty which had not become final. The statute operates only
against the government and not against the previous conduct of other
competing parties. Thus, section 3512(b) did nothing to increase the
successor licensee's liability for past conduct or to impose on it new duties
with respect to past actions. Put another way, the successor's loss of the
license was not traceable to application of the statute to its conduct.
It was also contended that even if the rule in question was not
primarily retroactive, it was nonetheless secondarily retroactive and
therefore invalid. In other words, but for the new statute, the license would
not have been lost, even if the statute did not directly apply. The D.C.
Circuit, quoting its opinion in DIRECT, Inc. v. FCC, 14 responded:
"Even uncontroversially prospective statutes may unsettle expectations
and impose burdens on past conduct: a new property tax or zoning
regulation may upset the reasonable expectations that prompted those
affected to acquire property; a new law banning gambling harms the
person who had begun to construct a casino before the law's enactment
or spent his life learning to count cards?'
• . . But we have never treated that sort of "retroactivity" as
necessarily violating a separate legal standard. A rule that upsets
expectations, as we held in Bell Atlantic Telephone Co. v. FCC, 79 F.3d
1195, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1996), may be sustained "if it is reasonable' i.e.,
if it is not "arbitrary" or "capricious."' 41
New section 3512(b) operated prospectively only and did not impair
any vested rights. Northeast's grant was not final when Congress amended
the 1980 PRA and in fact was predicated on the outcome of PortCell's
litigation. Moreover, all applicants signed a waiver of "any claim to the use
of any particular frequency or of the electromagnetic spectrum as against
the regulatory power of the United States because of the previous use of the
same, whether by license or otherwise.'
4 2
Finally, the change in law here, while outcome determinative, was
really nothing more than a clarification of a preexisting statute. The 1980
PRA overrode all other contrary laws in granting no penalty protection to
the public. While the new language (e.g., "at any time") is more specific, it
is also consistent in terms of scope. Just before the House unanimously
passed the statute, Representative Crapo, the author of section 3512(b),
said it was meant to "end any confusion which may exist in the courts and
Federal agencies about how section 3512 was originally intended to
140. 110F.3d816 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
141. Id. at 826 (citations omitted).
142. 47 U.S.C. § 304 (1994).
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work*'1 43 He noted the original Act "had always provided the public with
the right to petition the agencies or courts for complete relief at any time
during the agency or court review process to eliminate the effects of any
penalty. '"Similarly, the House Report on the 1995 legislation states: "the
intended scope, purposes, and requirements of section 3512's current
provisions on public enforcement of the Act's information collection
clearance requirements are unchanged. The section is amended, however,
for purposes of consistency and clarification"
145
The D.C. Circuit relied heavily on the override clause, which appears
in both the 1980 and 1995 Acts, in its decision. Thus, the only effect of the
1995 statute here is that it made explicit what was always implicit in the
1980 PRA-that the statutory bar on imposing such penalties overrides any
legal obstacle to raising the PRA defense in a pending case. Thus, if the
court of appeals had the opportunity to review the FCC's refusal to review
PortCell's PRA claim under the 1980 Act, the Commission's refusal to
confront its PRA violation may very well have been reversed. The
intervening amendment merely mooted the need to look back and interpret
whether notwithstanding any other law overrode all conflicting laws-
substantive and procedural. But, given the broad protective purpose of the
original public protection provision as recognized in Dole v. United Steel
Workers, 46 a court should have interpreted the override as complete even if
the 1980 PRA had not been amended.
D. Section 402(h) Was Not an Impediment to Implementing the
1995 PRA
In the instant case, the court was not troubled by Congress's
interjection of a new issue on remand despite section 402(h) of the
Communications Act, which provides: "[i]t shall be the duty of the
Commission ...to forthwith give effect [to the court's judgment], and
unless otherwise ordered by the court, to do so upon the basis of the
proceedings already had and the record upon which said appeal was heard
and determined " 47 Section 402(h) was no impediment because the old and
new PRA overrode all other laws. Both the court and the FCC agreed that
section 402(h) had been trumped by the notwithstanding clause. 48
143. 141 CONG. REc. H4376 (1995) (statement of Rep. Crapo).
144. Id.
145. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-99, at 27-28 (1995) (emphasis added).
146. 494 U.S. 26 (1990).
147. 47 U.S.C. § 402(h) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
148. In the recent Qualcomm Inc. case, the court utilized section 402(h) to insulate the
case from application of the intervening statute. Qualcomm Inc. v. FCC, No. 98-1246, 1999
WL 518838 (D.C. Cir. July 23, 1999). The statute involved, however, had no override
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Moreover, nothing in the court's judgment required the agency to
revoke PortCell's license and ignore a congressional directive to review a
matter never passed on by the court. The court held "that the FCC's waiver
decision was arbitrary and capricious because it was not based on any
rational waiver policy as required by our decision in WAIT Radio v. FCC,
418 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1969).... Accordingly, we vacate the waiver and
remand the case to the agency."
4 1
The court presumed the legality of the rule and thus assumed that the
issue before the Commission on remand would revolve around whether a
new waiver of the financial showing would be appropriate. Thus, the
court's disqualification language was dicta and merely a warning to the
Commission not to come back to the court with another unjustified waiver.
The court did not intend to deprive the FCC of authority to comply with an
intervening act of Congress that forced it to address the legality of the rule
itself under a preexisting statute-a matter never addressed by the court.
For example, had it been discovered on remand that the Commission
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case, the court surely would not
have intended for the Commission to ignore that fact.
The discussion at oral argument concerning the scope of the court's
earlier opinion and the agency's obligation to follow a congressional
enactment was instructive:
The Court: We had never decided this [PRA] issue.
Counsel: No, you did not decide this issue, but under 402(h) of
the Communications Act, your instructions to the Commission were
required to be decided by the Commission on the pre-existing [sic]
record.
The Court: Well, when the Court directed the FCC to resolve the
one issue, and on that basis award the license, that was the only issue
[i]n the case, and that's the context in which the Court addressed that.
But you are saying that it's somehow impermissible for the
Congress to pass a law that creates another issue because the Court has
said when there is only one issue, dispose of the case on this basis?
Counsel: Well, Your Honor, it's not-
The Court: Could... Congress have abolished the FCC or would
that be a violation of our mandate because they hadn't yet resolved this
question?1
50
Thus, the Commission's decision to comply with an act of Congress
did not require the Commission to disregard the judgment of the court. In
proviso. See id.
149. Northeast Cellular Tel. Co., L.P. v. FCC, 897 F.2d 1164, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
150. Transcript of Proceedings at 7-9, Saco River, Inc. v. FCC, 133 F.3d 25 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (No. 91-1248).
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fact, the FCC carried out the court's directive by reviewing the information
and deciding not to rewaive the rule. The intervening Act commanded the
agency, notwithstanding any other law, to address an assumption
underlying the court's ruling-the enforceability of the rule in question.
The ultimate result may not have been what the court contemplated on
remand, but it conformed to the law in effect at the time the FCC finally
decided the case.
In reality, it is not at all clear how much section 402(h) confines the
FCC during a remand proceeding where the court directs the agency to take
certain actions and the intervening statute has no override provision (or is
otherwise unclear as to its impact on pending cases). The enactment of
section 402(h) was in reaction to an FCC decision allowing new applicants
to file for a broadcast station after a limited remand, even though they had
missed the original cutoff period and a Supreme Court affirmance. The
FCC's decision was made after the court merely reversed an earlier FCC
decision denying the application of a timely filed applicant, Pottsville
Broadcasting Company, for a broadcast station. On review again, the D.C.
Circuit struck down the FCC action stating:
When... the [FCC] decision... is reversed and the cause remanded
for proceedings in accordance with our opinion order, it is the duty of
the Commission to comply with that order and, unless for some
exceptional reason it obtains leave of this court to reopen the case, to
reconsider the matter on the record and in light of this court's
. . 151
opinion.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed. 52 It recognized that the lower
court had applied the long-standing doctrine that lower courts are bound to
respect the mandate of an appellate court to an administrative agency.
Herein lies the problem. The Supreme Court viewed the FCC not as an
inferior court, but as an organization outside the judicial branch governed
by a broader charter (the public interest) than the lower courts. It reasoned
that under the Radio Act of 1927 3, the court of appeals was authorized to
"alter or revise the [Radio Commission's] decision appealed from and enter
such judgment as it may seem just"'15 4 The Communications Act of 1934,
however, took away the court of appeals' authority as "a superior and
revising agency" and limited the court to a purely judicial review
function.15 Thus, courts may correct errors of law and, on remand, the FCC
151. Pottsville Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 105 F.2d 36, 40-41 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
152. See FCC v. Pottsville Brdcst. Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940).
153. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (repealed 1934 & 1966).
154. Id. at 144.
155. 47 U.S.C. § 402 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). The adoption of the Administrative
Procedure Act also limited the scope of the court's review. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
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is bound to act on the correction. 15 6 However, "an administrative
determination in which is embedded a legal question open to judicial
review does not impliedly foreclose the administrative agency, after its
error has been corrected, from enforcing the legislative policy committed to
its charge."' 57 The court found, therefore, that once the Commission dealt
with the improvident dismissal, it was free to allow others to file and be
comparatively heard.
In 1952, responding to the unfairness of the comparative hearing
result in Pottsville, Congress enacted section 402(h), which closely
resembles the mandate rule enunciated by the lower court.5 1 The Senate
Report stated that "[s]ubsection (h) contains provisions which are intended
to confer upon the appellate court a measure of control commensurate with
the dignity and responsibility of that tribunal, requiring the Commission to
give effect to the judgment of the court in the absence of proceeding to
review."'1
59
The Federal Communications Bar Association stated that the
"amendment... is to cure the situation which arose out of Pottsville."'60
The Chairman of the FCC testified that the Commission was "disturbed by
a provision of subsection (h) that "would repeal the rule of the Supreme
Court in ... Pottsville" because "it would deprive the Commission of the
power to make a new determination in a proceeding, after a reversal upon
appeal," that, "while still adhering to the judgment of the court, would...
better serve the public interest than a decision based solely upon the cold
record of the earlier Commission proceeding?"
6
'
Despite the enactment of section 402(h), in Greater Boston Television
Corp. v. FCC,'62 the court expressly followed the Supreme Court's analysis
in Pottsville of the relationship between the Court and the FCC: "Under
Pottsville . . . it is our function as an appellate court-exercising both
supervisory power and responsibility of restraint-to consider what lies
within the agency's jurisdiction, and to avoid interference with the public
156. See Qualcomm Inc. v. FCC, No. 98-1246, 1999 WL 518838 (D.C. Cir. July 23,
1999).
157. Pottsville Brdcst. Co., 309 U.S. at 145.
158. See 47 U.S.C. § 402(h) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
159. S. REP. No. 44, at 12 (1951).
160. To Amend the Communications Act of 1934: Hearings of S. 1333 Before the
Subcomm. on Interstate and Forcing Commerce, 80th Cong. 87 (1947).
161. House Commerce Committee: Hearings on S. 658, 82nd Cong. 103 (1951).
Ironically, Pottsville is still widely cited today to demonstrate the great procedural latitude
of the Commission under the public interest standard.
162. 462 F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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interest as defined by Congress.', 63 Moreover, despite the language of
section 402(h), in Eastern Carolinas Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,'64 the court
reversed the FCC's refusal to update the record, even though the FCC
based their refusal on section 402(h). Again, however, in the recent
Qualcomm case, the court utilized section 402(h) to confine agency
discretion in the face of a tightly worded remand and reversed the FCC's
implementation of the intervening statute.'66
To be sure, the agency must follow the court's ruling under section
402(h) and the mandate rule.' 67 In fact, had the FCC petitioned the court to
follow the 1995 PRA amendments on remand, the court would have been
forced to grant the petition. Section 402(h) does not require blind
adherence in the face of a dispositive change in law overriding all other
laws and interjecting a new issue never ruled on by the court. Even if the
FCC's relationship with a reviewing court were coequal with that of a
lower court, the result would be the same. Lower courts are, of course,
bound by law to follow the reversal and remand by a higher court, unless
there is an intervening decisional change in law by Congress or higher
courts.
E. Once It Was Clear the FCC Had to Decide Whether It Had
Complied with the PRA, the Outcome Was Foreordained
Consistent with the OMB opinion letters filed with the FCC in other
cases involving financial showing requirements, the Commission found
here that: (1) the requirement to obtain and submit a firm financial
commitment letter involved an agency request for a collection of
information and thus was subject to OMB clearance under the 1995 PRA;
(2) at the time PortCell was required to make the showing under the rule,
the Commission had not obtained the required OMB control number; and
(3) therefore, the Commission had no authority to penalize PortCell for
noncompliance.
163. Id. at 281, 291.
164. 762 F.2d 95 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
165. See id. at 99, 101.
166. See Qualcomm Inc. v. FCC, No. 98-1246, 1999 WL 518838 (D.C. Cir. July 23,
1999).
167. See City of Cleveland v. Federal Power Comm'n, 561 F.2d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (subjecting administrative agencies to the mandate rule). Section 402(h) may very
well have been a response by Congress to subject the FCC to the mandate rule, which
governs the action of lower courts on remand, but even the mandate rule has its exceptions.
See Banco de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 183 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956
(1968) (upholding the lower court's action based on Congress's authority to change the
decisional criteria, even though the lower court's decision to apply a new law passed by
Congress conflicted with a prior Supreme Court ruling in the case).
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On the issue of PRA compliance, the FCC's determination was due
some deference, but the court never had to reach that point. Although the
PRA is not within the agency's usual expertise, the OMB, the organization
charged with implementation of the PRA, designated the FCC as the one
agency with demonstrated capabilities in the area of PRA compliance.
Moreover, the Commission's determination that section 22.917(b) was
subject to the 1995 PRA clearance was in part based on OMB's
determination in preceding cases that analogous financial showing
requirements were subject to the 1995 PRA.
Northeast argued that the 1995 PRA has no application here because
PortCell was not really penalized for failing to comply with the collection
of information required by section 22.917(b). Rather, by actually
attempting to comply with the rule, it was argued that PortCell
demonstrated that it was financially unqualified separate and apart from its
violation of the rule. In other words, the 1995 PRA only insulates a party
from a violation of the rule requiring the collection of information, but the
information filed can be used to prosecute for collateral misconduct-
fraud, misrepresentation, etc. Indeed, one court has noted that "[section]
3512 certainly protects against nonfeasance and may even protect against
misfeasance. It does not, however, protect against malfeasance."
6 1
This argument failed to recognize, however, that the substantive and
procedural requirements of section 22.917(b) are conceptually
.... 169
indistinguishable. Under section 22.917(b), the FCC merged the
substantive financial commitment and the procedural information
requirement. It reduced the financial qualification issue to whether an
applicant had obtained a firm financial commitment-a clear collection of
information subject to PRA clearance. Without question, the FCC has
discretion to reduce financial qualifications to such a "go-no go" test rather
than hold hearings or require other types of proof. In section 308(b) of the
Communications Act of 1934, the FCC may adopt whatever rules it deems
necessary with regard to the financial qualifications of an applicant. 70 The
court held that this discretion is absolute and would even allow the agency
168. United States v. Matsumoto, 756 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 (D. Haw. 1991); see also
United States v. Sasser, 974 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1992) (denying section 3512 protection to
a defendant who had knowingly filed false information); United States v. Weiss, 914 F.2d
1514, 1522 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that "it is no defense to a charge of filing false
statements that the government document that prescribed the details of filing had not been
approved by the Director of the [OMB]").
169. See Final Brief for Northeast Cellular Tel. Co., L.P., Saco River Cellular, Inc. v.
FCC, 133 F.3d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (No. 91-1248).
170. See 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1994).
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to adopt no financial or other requirements.'7 '
Nonetheless, it was argued that the no penalty protection of the 1995
PRA was limited to PortCell's failure to demonstrate that it had a firm
financial commitment and not to its failure to substantially obtain the
commitment. To demonstrate, the following analogy was offered:
[S]uppose that an FCC rule, which was not cleared with OMB,
required that cellular licensees both build eight-foot fences around
their transmitters and (without OMB clearance) submit as-built
drawings showing compliance, and suppose that PortCell filed
drawings showing that it had built a two-foot fence. The FCC would
clearly be entitled to enforce the substantive rule.
172
Under this "fence analogy" two separate regulatory requirements are
at issue: (1) the actual drawings of the fence and (2) the requirement to
build the fence. Here, however, there was only one unified requirement-to
obtain a firm financial commitment letter and submit it. Section 22.917(b)
is a unitary requirement in which an applicant must obtain and demonstrate
the fact that it has obtained by submitting the commitment letter.173 The
fence analogy fits well in the fraud-feasor context, 1 but fails in the context
of section 22.917(b). A more apt analogy might be to a rule which lacks
OMB clearance, but requires applicants to submit a supply contract prior to
building a fence. If the applicant fails to obtain the contract but builds the
fence, the 1995 PRA would prevent the agency from enforcing the rule.
The rule falls squarely within the scope of the 1995 PRA because the
procedural and substantive information requirements are merged.
Even if obtaining and submitting were separate requirements,
however, they would both constitute collections of information subject to
the 1995 PRA. The 1995 PRA covers both "direct" collections of
information-those that must be sent to an agency-and "indirect"
collections of information-those that "do not require records to be sent to
the agency [and] require only that records be kept on hand for possible
examination as part of a compliance review.'
7 1
171. See National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 645 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 922 (1976).
172. Final Brief for Northeast Cellular Tel. Co., L.P. at 30-31, Saco River Cellular, Inc.
v. FCC, 133 F.3d 25 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (No. 91-1248).
173. See Action Alliance of Senior Citizens v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 77, 80 (D.C. Cir.
1991). An interesting question is raised as to the breadth of 1980 PRA protection where
someone knowingly files false information pursuant to an invalid collection. For instance,
can someone engage in tax fraud pursuant to an uncleared tax form? The issue may very
well revolve around whether the collateral liability merges in the invalid collection
requirement or can be separated therefrom.
174. See, e.g., United States v. Sasser, 974 F.2d 1544 (1992); United States v.
Matsumoto, 756 F. Supp. 1361 (1991); United States v. Weiss, 914 F.2d 1514 (1990).
175. Dole v. Steelworkers, 494 U.S 26, 33 n.4 (1990).
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It was also argued that the section 22.917(b) showing was in essence
imposed by statute and thus exempt from OMB clearance under the OMB
rules and case law. Again, section 308(b), however, is permissive by its
terms and provides open-ended authority to develop rules according to
whatever the FCC decides is in the public interest. The section states that:
"the Commission by regulation may prescribe as to the... financial...
qualifications of the applicant to operate the station." 176 The Commission is
thus given discretion to decide whether and how an applicant will
demonstrate its financial qualification. To underscore the point, in National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC,177 the court found
that section 308(b):
[L]eaves it within the discretion of the Commission to decide which
facts relating to such factors it wished to have set forth in applications.
Since this leaves the Commission free to have no facts set forth on any
of these matters, if it finds such action appropriate, it follows
necessarily that the Commission is not required to consider financial
fitness if it deems it irrelevant to its regulatory scheme.
178
In any event, statutorily compelled information requirements, which
are reduced to regulations, must be submitted to OMB prior to
enforcement. 1
79
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, while the facts of this case are tortured, the result was
constitutionally compelled. When Congress has legislated clearly and there
are no impermissible retroactive consequences, the courts must apply the
law in effect at the time of their decision. Within this framework, the
agency had no discretion but to give effect to the 1995 PRA amendments.
Congress clearly indicated the intervening law applied to pending cases
and overrode all other laws. In any event, the 1995 PRA operated
prospectively in the context in which it was applied because the case was
not final.
The Supreme Court's approach to deciding whether to implement
legislative changes can be summarized as follows:
1. Has there been afinal judgment by the courts? In other words,
have all appeals and judicial proceedings that could affect the result in
the case been exhausted or foregone when the legislation went into
effect?
176. 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
177. 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 922 (1976).
178. Id. at 645.
179. See 5 C.F.R. § 1320.5(e)(1) (1999) (stating that OMB will clear all regulations
implementing statutorily required collections).
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If yes, the Separation of Powers doctrine prevents Congress from
legislating a change to the judgment.
If no, Congress may change the law to be applied at the time of
decision.
2. Where there is an intervening legislative change in an active
case, the threshold issue is whether Congress clearly indicated the
temporal reach of the statute.
If yes, the statute must be applied by the Courts-even if
application has retroactive consequences.
If no, the following judicial default principles apply.
3. Although not the exclusive test, would application of the new
statute have retroactive effect by attaching new legal consequences to
events completed before its enactment, i.e. would the statute impair
rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for
past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already
completed?
If yes, the traditional presumption against retroactive application
of law applies.
If no, the statute's application is not impermissibly retroactive.
Recent opinions appear to demonstrate that where a new statute's
application to an ongoing case would result in impermissible retroactivity,
courts are more likely to require the words of the statute to reflect
Congress's retroactive intent before applying the intervening law.
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